Analysis Report

vscode-bootstrap.cmd

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The image can be inaccurate, incomplete and/or incorrect.

General Information

Sample vscode-bootstrap.cmd
MD5 612d4b1ce3895110f8c32348fb64b813
SHA256 4740d59388fa9068550fe7d1b3cdf935c82f331f5a1845a8b0be839f95b539b4
File Type Windows command script (CMD)
File Size 38,653 bytes
Date/Time 2026-11-12 07:59:56 +01:00
Analysis duration 00:56:12
Mode UI

Detection

Malicious
Suspicious
Clean
Unknown
Classification backdoor
Score 96
Range 0 - 100
Confidence 85
Joe Reverser may be inaccurate, incomplete, or incorrect.

Screenshots

⊘ No Screenshots found.

AI Summary

Final Analysis: VS Code-Themed Bootstrap and Go Payload

Executive Summary

The submitted vscode-bootstrap.cmd is a malicious bootstrapper, not a VS Code editor installer. It obtains a genuine Node.js runtime, installs native-loading dependencies, and runs an obfuscated JavaScript stage; the requested Go payload separately demonstrates process injection, keyboard hooking, browser-profile access, and persistent startup registration. Its reconstructed image also contains an extensive “Akira Remote” control interface, although not every advertised feature was verified in the Go backend. The malicious verdict is well supported, but reverse-engineering coverage remains partial.

Assessment

Field Result
Verdict Malicious
Classification Backdoor, with loader and collection functionality
Threatname unknown
Score 96/100
Evidence Confidence 85/100
Assessment coverage Partial

The score above is this investigation’s assessment, separate from the Joe Sandbox scores below. Confidence is strongest for the observed injection, keyboard hook, persistence registration, and inspected bootstrap behavior; it is lower for untraced backend features and credential-decryption details.

1. Scope and Sample Identity

Material Identity and provenance
Submitted bootstrap vscode-bootstrap.cmd, 38,653 bytes
Bootstrap MD5 612d4b1ce3895110f8c32348fb64b813
Bootstrap SHA-256 4740d59388fa9068550fe7d1b3cdf935c82f331f5a1845a8b0be839f95b539b4
Requested Go payload Sandbox filename boing_payload.exe; exact-hash analysis 2004448, run 0
Requested Go MD5 d0892f6c7e70f452cf448a99f14bae73
Requested Go SHA-256 9142beebf6c7c20165c07c01a2166c8345e200c4d8c80c652e5bc791ca2c8df3
Different live Go payload Decoded during this investigation; MD5 34868347aa7293e8230c98330f7b84ae, SHA-256 e87b4995d6a58348ae4407b153bd4d96b7d179a5c07eaf45f00b9cef2c5da5f9

The requested target’s original, hash-identical disk executable was unavailable. Target-specific static analysis therefore used a PE reconstructed from saved process memory belonging to the exact-hash sandbox run. The newly downloaded live payload was preserved separately and was not substituted for the requested target.

2. Delivery Chain and VS Code Impersonation

Inspected CMD behavior

The executable CMD body:

  1. Checks for an existing Node.js installation.
  2. Otherwise downloads or extracts Node.js from nodejs.org, using %USERPROFILE%\.vscode\nodejs as its installation directory.
  3. Downloads a temporary .mjs script from realmadridistats.org.
  4. Installs koffi and lzma-native with npm.
  5. Hides several artifacts using attrib +h, executes the JavaScript with Node.js, and deletes the temporary script.

The body ends with the success message [SUCCESS] Script completed. and exit /b. No VS Code editor installation command occurs in that inspected body. The .vscode directory is being used as a location for the Node runtime, not as proof that VS Code is installed.

Sources: vscode-bootstrap.cmd, setup variables and executable body through exit /b; dependency command containing koffi lzma-native.

Obfuscated JavaScript stage

The certificate-style trailer decoded to a 23,127-byte JavaScript file, byte-identical to the downloaded stage recovered from the parent sandbox run. Data-only decoding recovered:

  • 10,107 bytes of VM bytecode.
  • A 3,332-byte pool containing 179 strings.
  • Imports for koffi and lzma-native.
  • Native API names including VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, CreateThread, GetProcAddress, RtlAddFunctionTable, AmsiScanBuffer, and AmsiScanString.

These findings support a VM-obfuscated native-loading stage. The exact AMSI patching and complete manual-loader control flow were not fully verified.

A live boing response was successfully decoded by character shift, Base64 decoding, and LZMA decompression. Its resulting hash differed from the requested Go target, so the historical end-to-end delivery of that exact original Go file was not independently reproduced.

Verified bootstrap execution outline

vscode-bootstrap.cmd
  ├─ Locate Node.js or retrieve official Node.js MSI/ZIP
  │   └─ notable sink: runtime beneath %USERPROFILE%\.vscode\nodejs
  ├─ curl retrieves bootstrap.php?js=1&win=...
  │   └─ notable sink: temporary ak*.mjs script
  ├─ npm install koffi lzma-native
  └─ Node.js executes the temporary MJS
      └─ Delete temporary script and print completion message

A complete VM-to-native unpacking call graph is not presented because the saved linear VM rendering was not a validated decompilation.

3. Go Payload: Static Inspection and Observed Behavior

3.1 Static reconstruction

The recovered Windows Go image had an entry-point RVA of 0x70500 and an image size of 0x11e6000. Reconstruction and rebasing enabled a saved function index covering 16,254 functions and 794 source-file entries, together with annotated assembly.

A nonstandard Go metadata header was located at file offset 0xcd96c0. Many application names were blank or mangled, complicating analysis. Ghidra failed to initialize on the reconstructed Go images; saved assembly and embedded assets remained available for targeted inspection.

The reconstructed PE retains runtime state and is not a hash-identical replacement for the original disk file.

3.2 Process injection — observed

Primary indicators from Joe Sandbox 2004448/run 0 record:

  • The Go process writing PE data beginning with 4D5A into cmd.exe and charmap.exe, at base 0x140000000.
  • The injected cmd.exe writing PE data into Chrome at 0x12CC98F0000.
  • That process creating remote threads in Chrome and Edge.
  • Changed thread contexts in the injected processes.

These are direct runtime indicators, not conclusions drawn solely from an automated summary or family signature.

3.3 Keyboard and browser collection — observed, with limits

The main process installed a global low-level keyboard hook. The relevant sandbox indicator reads:

0 keyboard low level NULL

It also opened a Firefox profile and files including containers.json and search.json.mozlz4.

This establishes hooking and browser-profile access. It does not establish which keystrokes were retained, that browser passwords were successfully decrypted, or that those credentials were transmitted. The precise browser-decryption and injected-component workflow remains unresolved.

Source: Joe Sandbox 2004448/run 0, hook, foreign-memory, remote-thread, and browser-file-open indicators.

Verified runtime relationships

This is an observed process/action outline, not a complete decompiled Go call graph.

boing_payload.exe (PID 7292; analysis 2004448/run 0)
  ├─ cmd.exe (PID 7500; injected PE)
  │   ├─ notable sink: Chrome PE write and remote-thread creation
  │   └─ notable sink: Edge remote-thread creation
  ├─ notable sink: charmap.exe PE injection (PID 7840)
  └─ cmd.exe (PID 424)
      └─ reg.exe (PID 7180)
          └─ notable sink: per-user Run value registration

4. Embedded Remote-Control Interface

The reconstructed target contains HTML/JavaScript titled:

<title>Akira Remote | {{USER_HOST}}</title>

The following is a client-side protocol map. It is not proof that every server handler exists, succeeds, or executed during the sandbox run.

Embedded function area Inspected interface
Desktop/control and video WebSockets /ws, /ws/stream; optional H.264 request
Remote input WebSocket /ws/input
Terminal /ws/term, with terminal dimensions, optional shell=cmd, and working-directory parameter
Camera and audio WebSockets /ws/cam, /ws/audio
Keyboard history /api/keys, /api/keys/clear
Clipboard /api/clipboard/history, /api/clipboard/set, /api/clipboard/clear
Browser recovery /api/recovery/grab, /passwords, /tokens, /autofill
SOCKS5 /api/socks5/addrs, /status, /start, /stop
Fetch-and-run /api/files/fetch, with url, path, run, hidden, and args fields
Memory execution request /api/mem/run?host=..., optionally with arguments
Defender controls Status, feature toggles, removal, restoration, and exclusions under /api/defender/

The WebSocket constructors use location.host. Consequently, the client connects to the host serving the panel rather than specifying a fixed external control server.

Memory-upload encoding

Inspected JavaScript prepares memory-execution uploads using:

  • AES-256-GCM.
  • A key derived as SHA-256 of akira-mem-exec-v1.
  • A random 12-byte IV.
  • Wire format [IV][ciphertext + 16-byte authentication tag].

This describes the embedded client’s encoding. The corresponding Go decryption and execution handler was not traced. The interface supplies C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe as its default host-process path.

Defender and attribution caveats

The embedded Defender requests show intended control functionality, not observed Defender removal or disabling.

Likewise, “Akira Remote” is an interface label, not an established malware-family attribution. Neither it nor the sandbox’s community Yara matches establishes Akira ransomware or OlympicDestroyer involvement.

Sources: target_go_strings.txt, title at file offset 0x00b6691f; WebSocket constructors around 0x0109ce08–0x010d201e; recovery, execution, and Defender JavaScript sections.

5. Persistence

The exact-target process tree records the Go process launching cmd.exe, which launches reg.exe to create:

Item Observed value
Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Value name Microsoft Display Driver Manager
Type REG_SZ
Executable %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Python\Python399\python3\pythonw.exe
Script argument %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Python\Python399\python3\exec.py

Recovered registry-command output states:

The operation completed successfully

The small exec.py imports and calls updater.update(). Its dependency was recovered as updater.cp313-win_amd64.pyd, a compiled Cython extension, rather than a Python source file.

Bounded decompilation identified:

  • update at 0x180003820.
  • fetchurls at 0x180002360.
  • The exported PyInit_updater initialization routine.

The updater’s full retrieval, decoding, and execution semantics remain unresolved because its Python-object calls and constants were not completely recovered. The observed Run registration is established independently of those unresolved semantics.

Sources: Joe Sandbox 2004448/run 0, process tree; stdout.22.dr; exec.py.0.dr; updater decompilations.

6. Infrastructure, Configuration, and Data Transfer

6.1 Blockchain-backed staging

Target-run memory contained an eth_call request with:

{"data":"0x6d4ce63c","to":"0xF97CB22B8dBd52790493e962d4684B3FDB08A2Be"}

The accompanying ABI response decoded into seven /go/boing delivery URLs, listed below. These are staging locations, not established interactive C2 endpoints. Relevant buffers were recovered from the run, including activity associated with injected components; no single Go function was conclusively assigned ownership of the entire exchange.

The bootstrap also supplies an encoded REALTEKAUDIO value. The standalone Go run invoked echo %REALTEKAUDIO%, but recovered output retained the literal variable reference. The complete decoding scheme and behavior when configuration is absent remain unresolved.

6.2 Cloudflare tunnel

Recovered cloudflared output records a quick tunnel:

https://horse-pathology-reader-incoming.trycloudflare.com

with local target:

http://localhost:49705

The log identifies cloudflared 2026.10.7 and settings including protocol:quic. Sandbox evidence also records the cloudflared download request and network activity under calc.exe.

Combined with the same-host panel design, this strongly suggests a local control service exposed through Cloudflare. The exact panel-to-listener routing, authentication, and method of hosting the tunnel component under the observed process identity were not fully established.

The Go version printed by cloudflared belongs to that component; it does not establish the target payload’s compiler version.

6.3 GoFile and Telegram distinction

Run memory contained a GoFile upload request and a response with status:"ok" for:

  • Archive: DESKTOP-OYF2376_Maoga.zip
  • Size: 2,818 bytes
  • MD5: 31bf812af4289d88319b87c32f428b34
  • Returned link: https://gofile.io/d/0en1hyZd

This is evidence of an upload transaction recovered from memory. The archive contents were not inspected, so it does not establish which information was transferred. A separate recovered report string listed zero browser-item counts.

The panel displays “Full grab started … exfiltrating to Telegram.” No Telegram bot token, destination chat, or successful Telegram delivery was verified. The UI message must therefore remain separate from the recovered GoFile transaction.

Sources: decoded staging artifact decoded_contract_config.json; cloudflared stdout.25.dr; run-0 memory region 0xC0010FC000, response near +0xe800 and upload request near +0x14000.

7. Key Suspicious Indicators and False Positive Analysis

The decisive indicators are the combination of:

  • PE injection into system and browser processes.
  • A global low-level keyboard hook.
  • Browser-profile access.
  • Successful persistent startup registration under a misleading driver-management name.
  • Hidden bootstrap artifacts and VM-obfuscated JavaScript.
  • An embedded remote-control interface offering collection, execution, tunneling, and security-control requests.

Node.js, npm dependencies, Cloudflare Tunnel, and FFmpeg are legitimate technologies. Their presence alone would not justify a malicious verdict. Here, the observed injection, hooking, deceptive persistence, and inspected loader behavior provide the independent basis for that verdict.

The sandbox labels EtherHiding and chromElevator are useful correlation leads. They do not replace inspection of the blockchain and browser-injection behavior, and no specific malware family is established.

8. Indicators of Compromise

Domains and shared-service IPs are contextual indicators, not blanket judgments about every resource hosted by their providers. Decoded staging URLs were not all successfully contacted.

Type Value Source context
Domain realmadridistats.org CMD JavaScript retrieval and decoded Go staging
Domains seaofstar.st, cosmicsky.xyz, cosmicsky.cc, waterseas.xyz, dpdc737.dpdatacenter.com, dongphucasian.com Decoded staging configuration
URL https://realmadridistats.org/well-known/acme-challenge/bootstrap.php?js=1&win=... CMD download; win carries the encoded configuration
URL https://seaofstar.st/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing Decoded staging URL
URL https://cosmicsky.xyz/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing Decoded staging URL
URL https://cosmicsky.cc/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing Decoded staging URL; live retrieval produced a different payload
URL https://realmadridistats.org/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing Decoded staging URL
URL https://waterseas.xyz/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing Decoded staging URL
URL https://dpdc737.dpdatacenter.com/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing Decoded staging URL
URL https://dongphucasian.com/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing Decoded staging URL
URL https://cosmicsky.xyz/well-known/pki-validation/go/akgo.php Injected charmap.exe memory; precise role unresolved
Contract 0xF97CB22B8dBd52790493e962d4684B3FDB08A2Be Target-run eth_call; selector 0x6d4ce63c
RPC URL https://bsc-dataseed.binance.org Public RPC infrastructure present in run memory
Tunnel URL https://horse-pathology-reader-incoming.trycloudflare.com Recovered quick-tunnel output
Local endpoint http://localhost:49705 Tunnel’s local target
Upload URLs https://store9.gofile.io/contents/uploadfile, https://store-eu-par-7.gofile.io/contents/uploadfile, https://store-na-phx-3.gofile.io/contents/uploadfile GoFile endpoints recovered from memory
Service URL https://api.gofile.io/servers GoFile server discovery
File links https://gofile.io/d/0en1hyZd, https://gofile.io/d/JbLIXx1v, https://gofile.io/d/pVKv6vAF Upload response or report strings; contents not assessed
IP 94.139.32.9 Active DNS association with store9.gofile.io
IP 104.16.231.132 Shared Cloudflare infrastructure associated with api.trycloudflare.com
Registry value HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run → Microsoft Display Driver Manager Confirmed persistence registration
File exec.py — SHA-256 fe675305434b8a795c7e1835b914872a9011b3706852f6f8a2eafebdc2d21f41 Persistent startup script
File updater.cp313-win_amd64.pyd — SHA-256 de9ae90c94f3e8aad7454a197e946c692cd780a949ee8464eeca83937ead9a8e Compiled updater dependency
File remotevnc\ffmpeg\ffmpeg.exe.download — SHA-256 3256173f3f8bffd7df12227c68adf68025edb1832273a9530688a7bb1ed8edec 105,423,872-byte download; contents and legitimacy unverified

9. Joe Sandbox Correlation

Source Run Verdict Score Key Evidence Report URL
Joe Sandbox 0 Malicious 68/100 Exact bootstrap hash; JavaScript staging artifacts https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/2004039/0/html
Joe Sandbox 0 Malicious 100/100 Exact requested Go hash; injection, keyboard hook, browser-profile access and persistence https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/2004448/0/html

10. Evidence Limitations and Unresolved Coverage

The overall assessment remains partial. Report generation does not resolve the following gaps:

  • Original target unavailable: The unpacked-file download failed. Static target work used a runtime reconstruction from the exact-hash run, retaining runtime state rather than original-file bytes.
  • Go decompilation incomplete: Ghidra failed on the reconstructed Go images. Saved assembly and recovered metadata enabled targeted work, but not a complete backend call graph.
  • Control interface versus implementation: Authentication, listener initialization, and the server handlers for terminal, camera/audio, SOCKS5, memory execution, fetch-and-run, and Defender controls were not fully traced. Their presence in client code is not proof of execution.
  • Credential theft not fully resolved: Browser-profile access and browser injection are observed; successful password decryption, captured keystrokes, clipboard theft or replacement, and transferred credential contents are not established.
  • Configuration incomplete: REALTEKAUDIO, its absent-value behavior, and the complete orchestration between blockchain staging and control initialization remain unresolved.
  • Persistence dependency incomplete: Run-key creation is confirmed, but the Cython updater’s complete retrieval and execution logic remains unresolved. Its decompilation output also contained truncated portions.
  • Loader coverage remains open: VM data was decoded, but exact AMSI modifications and the full native-loading sequence were not verified.
  • Tunnel and auxiliary components: Cloudflared logs establish tunnel creation, but exact control routing and hosting under calc.exe remain incompletely resolved. The FFmpeg-named download was inventoried, not independently assessed.
  • Live-stage version mismatch: The current download is a different Go binary and was not fully reversed. The reconstructed and rebased target artifacts likewise did not receive complete semantic assessment.
  • Transfer evidence has content limits: GoFile request/response material was recovered from memory, but archive contents and Telegram delivery were not verified. Other memory-only endpoints remain role-uncertain.
  • Resource and output limits: Both shell execution and artifact reading reached their 30-call limits. Several earlier outputs were truncated, limiting examination of the full submission and auxiliary material.

These limits reduce completeness and confidence in individual feature claims, but they do not negate the independently corroborated malicious behavior.

11. Recorded Analysis Workflow

vscode-bootstrap.cmd and requested Go target investigation
  ├─ Establish hashes and inspect CMD setup/execution
  ├─ Decode embedded JavaScript and VM data
  ├─ Retrieve exact-hash sandbox artifacts
  │   └─ Reconstruct target memory image and recover Go function index
  ├─ Inspect saved assembly and embedded control-interface code
  ├─ Correlate primary runtime indicators and persistence artifacts
  │   └─ Boundedly decompile the Cython updater
  └─ Preserve partial coverage and unresolved dependencies
      └─ Stop after resource limits and user-requested completion

Conclusion: The evidence establishes a malicious bootstrap and an associated Go backdoor/collection payload. Injection, hooking, and persistent registration are directly corroborated; the broader remote-control feature set is substantially documented in embedded client code but remains only partially verified at the Go backend.

IOCs

Type Name Status SHA256
file vscode-bootstrap.cmd
Malicious 4740d59388fa9068550fe7d1b3cdf935c82f331f5a1845a8b0be839f95b539b4
file boing_payload.exe (requested target)
Malicious 9142beebf6c7c20165c07c01a2166c8345e200c4d8c80c652e5bc791ca2c8df3
md5 d0892f6c7e70f452cf448a99f14bae73
Malicious —
file boing_payload.exe (different live decoded variant)
— e87b4995d6a58348ae4407b153bd4d96b7d179a5c07eaf45f00b9cef2c5da5f9
file boing (encoded live response)
— abd27739e413bf5336f346d7e461258bdb64d3bde70729506d045886946ad5c1
file exec.py
Malicious fe675305434b8a795c7e1835b914872a9011b3706852f6f8a2eafebdc2d21f41
file updater.cp313-win_amd64.pyd
Malicious de9ae90c94f3e8aad7454a197e946c692cd780a949ee8464eeca83937ead9a8e
file remotevnc\ffmpeg\ffmpeg.exe.download
— 3256173f3f8bffd7df12227c68adf68025edb1832273a9530688a7bb1ed8edec
domain realmadridistats.org
— —
domain seaofstar.st
— —
domain cosmicsky.xyz
— —
domain cosmicsky.cc
— —
domain waterseas.xyz
— —
domain dpdc737.dpdatacenter.com
— —
domain dongphucasian.com
— —
url https://realmadridistats.org/well-known/acme-challenge/bootstrap.php?js=1&win=25....VUpGantoW3V+WU9ke1Q6SElXSm4zTEtaOmVaZVpYdnlaXTIxejxpPDQ3N2Y3NjJJOjk6NDZHNjgzOUVJRjs4ZTsyMzc2NmY4RDg1OEUwZmgycnN5OTM0dnR8N3J2eHZ7aDp4fGU0O2g8ZGh1cnB2cnNncm10c35tNGppcWY6ZXx3NzRzc3U1aWd0OXMuNjVme0RSdXg4RDtQdUpzNGZoT2tWcGdaZlRaTltOQzlHNzlwSkxsUVd3bEk=
Malicious —
url https://seaofstar.st/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing
Malicious —
url https://cosmicsky.xyz/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing
Malicious —
url https://cosmicsky.cc/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing
Malicious —
url https://realmadridistats.org/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing
Malicious —
url https://waterseas.xyz/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing
Malicious —
url https://dpdc737.dpdatacenter.com/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing
Malicious —
url https://dongphucasian.com/well-known/pki-validation/go/boing
Malicious —
url https://cosmicsky.xyz/well-known/pki-validation/go/akgo.php
— —
blockchain_contract 0xF97CB22B8dBd52790493e962d4684B3FDB08A2Be
Malicious —
blockchain_method_selector 0x6d4ce63c
— —
url https://bsc-dataseed.binance.org
— —
url https://horse-pathology-reader-incoming.trycloudflare.com
Malicious —
domain horse-pathology-reader-incoming.trycloudflare.com
Malicious —
url http://localhost:49705
— —
domain api.trycloudflare.com
— —
url https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases/latest/download/cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe
— —
url https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases/download/2026.10.7/cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe
— —
url https://api.gofile.io/servers
— —
url https://store9.gofile.io/contents/uploadfile
— —
url https://store-eu-par-7.gofile.io/contents/uploadfile
— —
url https://store-na-phx-3.gofile.io/contents/uploadfile
— —
url https://gofile.io/d/0en1hyZd
— —
url https://gofile.io/d/JbLIXx1v
— —
url https://gofile.io/d/pVKv6vAF
— —
ip 94.139.32.9
— —
ip 104.16.231.132
— —
registry_value HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Display Driver Manager
Malicious —
file_path %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Python\Python399\python3\exec.py
Malicious fe675305434b8a795c7e1835b914872a9011b3706852f6f8a2eafebdc2d21f41
file DESKTOP-OYF2376_Maoga.zip
— —
md5 31bf812af4289d88319b87c32f428b34
— —
url https://www.gyan.dev/ffmpeg/builds/ffmpeg-release-essentials.zip
— —
embedded_encryption_passphrase akira-mem-exec-v1
— —

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Evidence
Execution T1059.003
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
The submitted CMD executes the bootstrap logic; exact-target analysis 2004448/run 0 also records boing_payload.exe launching cmd.exe, including the persistence registration chain.
Execution T1059.007
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
The inspected CMD invokes Node.js with its downloaded temporary MJS stage after installing koffi and lzma-native.
Defense Evasion T1055
Process Injection
Analysis 2004448/run 0 records MZ-prefixed foreign-memory writes by boing_payload.exe into cmd.exe and charmap.exe, PE writes from cmd.exe into Chrome, and remote-thread creation in Chrome and Edge.
Persistence T1547.001
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Analysis 2004448/run 0 records successful creation of HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value Microsoft Display Driver Manager, invoking Python399\python3\pythonw.exe with exec.py.
Collection T1056.001
Input Capture: Keylogging
The main Go process installs a global low-level keyboard hook in analysis 2004448/run 0; the embedded client also requests keyboard history through /api/keys. Actual retained or transmitted keystrokes were not established.
Defense Evasion T1564.001
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
The inspected CMD uses attrib +h on the Node directory, temporary JavaScript and dependency-related artifacts.
Defense Evasion T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
The embedded JavaScript implements a custom VM with decoded 10107-byte bytecode and a 3332-byte string pool containing 179 strings; live staging data also required character shifting, Base64 decoding and LZMA decompression.
Command and Control T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
The CMD retrieves the remote MJS stage, and exact-target sandbox network evidence records a request for cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe from the Cloudflare GitHub release path.
Command and Control T1572
Protocol Tunneling
Recovered cloudflared stdout from analysis 2004448/run 0 records a quick tunnel at horse-pathology-reader-incoming.trycloudflare.com with url:http://localhost:49705 and protocol:quic. Exact linkage to the embedded panel handlers remains unresolved.